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WHAT’S THE DEFERENCE?:       
UNITED STATES V. HINKSON 
OUTLINES A NEW TEST FOR “ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION” 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to United States v. Hinkson, under the prevailing 
analysis used to determine whether the trial court had engaged in 
an “abuse of discretion,” there was arguably “no effective limit” on 
an appellate court’s power to substitute its own judgment for that 
of the district court.1  Rather, it was left to the appellate panel to 
decide whether it had a “definite and firm conviction that [a] 
mistake [had] been committed,” or whether a trial court’s factual 
finding was even “permissible.”2 
But in Hinkson, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit took the 
opportunity to elaborate on the abuse-of-discretion standard.  The 
Hinkson court adopted a two-part test that appellate courts should 
follow to make an objective determination as to whether a district 
court abused its discretion in applying a rule of law to the facts in 
denying a motion for a new trial.3  Although accompanied by a 
vigorous dissent, the Hinkson abuse-of-discretion test has quickly 
become a powerful influence and has been widely cited 
throughout the circuit.4 
 
 1 United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 2 Id. (citing United States v. 4.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Lincoln 
County, Mont., 546 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 3 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261. 
 4 In the two months following the decision, Hinkson was cited in twenty-one 
opinions by courts within the Ninth Circuit and in numerous briefs by counsel.  See, e.g., 
1
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II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. FACTS 
 
 Idaho businessman David Hinkson owned and operated a 
water-bottling company called WaterOz.5  In 2000, Hinkson hired 
Elven Joe Swisher, a water-safety tester, to periodically assess 
WaterOz water.6  Hinkson and Swisher eventually became 
friends.7  Over the course of their friendship, Hinkson learned that 
Swisher had served in the United States Marine Corps as a 
firearms expert and that during this service Swisher “had killed a 
number of people in the Korean War.”8 
According to Swisher, in April 2002, Hinkson offered him 
$10,000 per head if he were to torture and kill local attorney 
Dennis Albers and his family.9  Hinkson allegedly told Swisher that 
Albers had been causing him legal troubles.10 
During this same time period, Assistant United States 
Attorney Nancy Cook and Special Agent Steven Hines of the 
Internal Revenue Service spearheaded an investigation into 
Hinkson’s failure to pay federal income tax on WaterOz profits.11  
In the summer of 2002, just a few months before Cook and Hines 
led a search of Hinkson’s home, Hinkson allegedly asked that 
Swisher treat Cook, Hines, and their families “the same way as 
Albers.”12  In November of 2002, Cook and Hines executed search 
warrants on Hinkson’s home, which led to Hinkson’s eventual 
indictment and conviction for tax evasion.13 
 
 
Judge Edward J. Lodge presided over the tax-evasion case.14  
While on pretrial release for the tax-evasion charges, Hinkson 
extended another request to Swisher.15  This new offer of $10,000 
 
Lemoge  v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1192 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 5 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251; see also WaterOz: About Us, 
http://www.wateroz.com/about-us.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). 
 6 Id. at 1251 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 1251-52. 
 9 Id. at 1252. 
 10 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252. 
 11 Id. at 1252. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id.; see also United States v. Hinkson, 281 F. App’x 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 14 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252. 
 15 Id. 
2
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per head would now include Judge Lodge and his family.16 
After several unsuccessful attempts to solicit Swisher’s 
services, Hinkson approached James Harding.17  Hinkson met 
Harding at a 2003 Health Forum in Southern California and 
subsequently offered the former bodyguard a job at WaterOz and 
invited him to stay at his home.18  It was during this stay that 
Hinkson requested that Harding kill Cook, Hines, and Judge 
Lodge in exchange for $20,000.19  Harding refused but was later 
re-approached by Hinkson with the same proposal in March 
2003.20  After refusing Hinkson’s offer yet again, Harding reported 
the solicitations to the FBI.21 
That same year, Swisher reported Hinkson’s solicitation of his 
services to an Idaho state prosecutor and the FBI.22  On 
September 21, 2004, a federal grand jury in Idaho indicted 
Hinkson for soliciting the murders of Attorney Cook, Special Agent 
Hines, and Judge Lodge.23 
 
A. FACTS 
1.  Trial 
Hinkson was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 37324 with nine 
counts of solicitation to commit a crime of violence.25 
 
The solicitation case against Hinkson went to trial on January 
11, 2005, and lasted a total of two weeks.26  A few days into the 
trial, Elven Joe Swisher, with a Purple Heart medal27 pinned to his 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 A person violates 18 U.S.C. § 373 if he or she “solicits, commands, induces, or 
otherwise endeavors to persuade [another] person to engage” in “conduct constituting a 
felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United 
States.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 373(a) (Westlaw 2004). 
 25 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1252-53. 
 26 Id. at 1253. 
 27 “The decoration known as the Purple Heart (authorized to be awarded pursuant to 
Executive Order 11016) may only be awarded to a person who is a member of the armed 
forces at the time the person is killed or wounded under circumstances otherwise qualifying 
3
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lapel, took the stand as a prosecutorial witness.28  On direct 
examination, Swisher testified that he had served in the United 
States Marine Corps.29  The prosecutor refrained from inquiry into 
Swisher’s actual combat experience or commendations, but 
instead focused on what Swisher “had told Hinkson of his [Korean 
War] combat experience.”30  Swisher testified that, with this 
knowledge, Hinkson solicited his assistance in murdering Cook, 
Hines, and Judge Lodge.31 
After cross-examining Swisher and attacking his credibility 
with inconsistencies in his testimony, Hinkson’s attorney asked for 
a sidebar conference.32  Hinkson’s attorney indicated that Swisher 
could not have served in the Korean War as he would only have 
been 13 to 16 years old at the time.33  Hinkson’s attorney then 
presented to the court a letter he had received that morning from 
Bruce Tolbert, an archives technician with the National Personnel 
Records Center (Tolbert Letter).34  The Tolbert Letter stated that 
Swisher’s official military records did not indicate any honorable 




Hinkson’s attorney moved to re-open cross-examination in 
order to question Swisher on his military service and more 
specifically on the pin adorning his lapel.36  The prosecution 
objected, arguing that direct examination was limited to what 
Hinkson was told and not Swisher’s actual service nor his 
commendations.37  When the court granted the defense’s request 
to re-open the cross examination of Swisher, the prosecution 
 
that person for award of the Purple Heart.”  10 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (Westlaw 2010). 
 28 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1253. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 1253-54. 
 33 The Korean War lasted from 1950-1953.  Swisher was born in 1937 and therefore 
was only 13-16 years old during the Korean War. 
 34 The National Personnel Records Center (NPCR) maintains the official military 
record of those in the Armed Forces.  NPCR maintains the official military record of 
deceased and discharged veterans of the Armed Forces.  The National Archives, Military 
Personnel Records, http://www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/ (last visited Apr. 
23, 2010). 
 35 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
4
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warned Hinkson’s attorney not to “go there.”38  When cross-
examination resumed, Swisher testified that he was awarded the 
Purple Heart by the United States military and, following the 
Korean War, he served on classified missions to free prisoners 
from secret North Korean prison camps.39 
Hinkson’s attorney then placed the Tolbert Letter before 
Swisher and asked him if he did in fact receive the Purple Heart.40  
Swisher answered “yes” and presented a piece of paper entitled 
“Replacement DD-214.”41  The form stated that Swisher was 
entitled to wear the Purple Heart because he was injured by 
shrapnel in combat.42  The Replacement DD-214 was dated 
October 1957 and stamped certified by a Captain W.J. 
Woodring.43  The court then learned that the prosecution had 
already known of the Replacement DD-214.44  After denying the 
defense’s motion for a mistrial, the court instructed the jury to 
“disregard completely all of Mr. Swisher’s testimony with regard to 




Seven days after Swisher took the stand, Hinkson’s lawyer 
brought forth a letter from Lt. Col. K.G. Dowling of the National 
Personnel Management Support Branch of the United States 
Marine Corps (Dowling Letter).46  The Dowling Letter was 
addressed to Ron Keeley of the Idaho Veterans Affairs Services.47  
It stated that Swisher had tried to use the Replacement DD-214 to 
obtain benefits and that the Dowling Letter was a response to 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254.  The DD-214 Form is also known as a Report of 
Separation.  It is routinely used to verify military service for the purposes of benefits, 
retirement, employment, and membership in veterans’ organizations. Information contained 
in this report may include the service member’s period of service, type of duty, rank, 
medals, awards, commendations, and any foreign tours.  The National Archives, DD Form 
214, Discharge Papers and Separation Documents, 
http://www.archives.gov/veterans/military-service-records/dd-214.html (last visited Apr. 23, 
2010). 
 42 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254-55. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1255. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
5
Jones: United States v. Hinkson
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
406 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Keeley’s inquiry into the form’s authenticity.48  The Dowling Letter 
stated that the medals listed in the Replacement DD-214 were not 
contained in Swisher’s official file.49  The letter went on to state 
that several of the medals contained in the Replacement DD-214 
form did not even exist at the time it was dated.50 
Swisher’s military record was subsequently subpoenaed and 
reviewed in camera.51  The file contained a Replacement DD-214 
Form identical to Swisher’s proffered copy except that it did not list 
any medals or commendations.52  But the file also contained a 
letter from Captain Woodring, the officer who certified Swisher’s 
version of the DD-214, stating Swisher was authorized to wear the 
Purple Heart and other medals.53 
The court informed the parties that the record appeared to 
support Swisher’s claims that he was involved in top-secret 
assignments and was awarded various commendations.54  
However, the court also noted that the record was complex and 
difficult to decipher, and that the documents were not self-
authenticating or self-explanatory.55  The court emphasized that 
testimony from the custodian of records as to the complex military 
file or Captain Woodring as to the authenticity of the DD-214 form 
would be required to authenticate it as admissible evidence.56 
 
But instead of requesting a continuance to procure such 
testimony, Hinkson’s attorney instead moved to admit Swisher’s 
military file and the Dowling letter into evidence.57  The court then 
denied both pieces of proffered evidence on the grounds that they 
were inadmissible under Rules 40358 and 608(b)59 of the Federal 
 
 48 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1255. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 1255-56. 
 51 Id. at 1256. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1256. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 FED. R. EVID. 403 provides as follows:   
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
 59 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) states as follows: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
6
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Rules of Evidence60 as mere extrinsic evidence that would serve 
no purpose other than to attack Swisher’s character for 
truthfulness.61  The court noted that the evidence would distract 
and confuse the jury and ultimately be a waste of time.62  Hinkson 
was subsequently convicted for soliciting Swisher to murder Cook, 
Hines, and Judge Lodge.63 
2.  Post-Trial 
Based on new evidence, Hinkson made a motion for a new 
trial.64  Hinkson offered a letter from Chief Warrant Officer W.E. 
Miller (Miller Affidavit).65  Miller, the liaison to the National 
Personnel Records Center, stated that the Replacement DD-214 
form offered by Swisher was forged and that Swisher’s injuries 
were the result of a civilian car accident rather than military 
combat.66  Hinkson also provided an affidavit from Captain 
Woodring (Woodring Affidavit).67  In the affidavit, Woodring stated 
that he never signed the Replacement DD-214 nor did he submit 
the Woodring Letter located in Swisher’s military record.68 
Reviewing the motion and the evidence in light of the factors 
identified in United States v. Harrington,69 the trial judge denied 
the motion for a new trial.70  In the order denying the motion, the 
trial judge outlined his findings of facts that led him to conclude 
that Hinkson failed to meet the requirements of the Harrington 
test.71 
 
supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as 
provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, 
in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness 
being cross-examined has testified. 
 60 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1256. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1257. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257; see United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598 (9th Cir. 
2005).  For a discussion of the Harrington test, see infra Part III(B)(1). 
 70 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257. 
 71 Id. 
7
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The lower court came to the conclusion that the evidence 
offered in support of the motion was not “newly discovered.”72  
Rather, the trial judge found that the Woodring and Miller affidavits 
offered nothing substantively different from the evidence available 
at trial.73  The trial court noted that Hinkson’s lawyer mentioned 
that he had been investigating Swisher’s military record for “quite 
some time” because Swisher’s birth date made it doubtful that he 
had served in the Korean War.74  The trial judge also highlighted 
the fact that, months prior to the criminal trial, defense counsel 
represented Hinkson in a civil suit against Swisher.75 
The trial court went on to state that, prior to the criminal case 
going to trial, the prosecution also provided defense counsel with 
Swisher’s grand jury testimony containing similar irregularities.76  
The trial judge concluded that Hinkson’s attorney had not been 
diligent in following any of these leads.77  The trial court also found 
the Miller Letter and the Woodring Affidavit to be cumulative of 
what had already been offered at trial and that the materials were 
offered for the sole purpose of impeaching Swisher.78  The court 
concluded that the two documents were excludable under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in that they constituted unfairly 
prejudicial evidence (Rule 403) and constituted extrinsic evidence 
of specific conduct offered to attack Swisher’s character for 
truthfulness (Rule 608(b)).79 
On appeal from the district court’s ruling, a Ninth Circuit three-
judge panel held that the trial court abused its discretion and 
reversed the ruling on the motion for a new trial, but the Ninth 
Circuit granted a rehearing en banc.80  An en banc panel 
subsequently heard the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling.81 
 
III. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
 
 
 72 Id. at 1258. 
 73 Id. at 1257-58. 
 74 Id. at 1258. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1258. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 United States v. Hinkson, 526 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, 
547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 81 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251. 
8
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A.  IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The first issue before the en banc court in Hinkson was 
identifying the appropriate standard of review.  When the issue on 
appeal is purely a question of law, the appellate court reviews the 
case de novo.82  If the court is to review factual findings, then the 
abuse-of-discretion standard is applied.83  But determining the 
lens through which an appellate court must analyze the 
application of law in the context of a trial court’s factual findings 
requires further inquiry into the substance of the issue on review.84 
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court 
opined that in reviewing a trial court’s factual findings, “the abuse-
of-discretion and clearly erroneous standards are 
indistinguishable.”85  A clearly erroneous assessment of the facts 
would equate to a trial court abusing its discretion.86  Thus, a court 
of appeals may conclude that a district court abused its discretion 
in making a factual finding only if the factual finding was clearly 
erroneous.87 
The Supreme Court in United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co. held that, despite evidence supporting the trial 
court’s factual finding, an appellate court may still find it clearly 
erroneous if the evidence as a whole gives rise to a “definite and a 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”88  Therefore, 
under this type of review, an appellate court must ask “‘whether, 
on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.’”89 
However, just a year later, in United States v. Yellow Cab 
Co., the Supreme Court concluded that, when the factual 
evidence offers two permissible views, a trial court does not 
commit clear error in choosing between the two.90  This affords a 
trial court greater discretion to adopt one factual conclusion, even 
if the weight of the evidence favors another conclusion, so long as 
 
 82 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), 
abrogated on other grounds, Estate of Merchant v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 83 Id. at 1200. 
 84 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1259. 
 85 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 405 (1990)). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 89 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 
395). 
 90 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949). 
9
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there is sufficient evidence to support either conclusion.91  This 
ruling contrasted with Gypsum’s authorization for an appellate 
court to reverse whenever it develops a “definite and firm 
conviction” that the trial court made a mistake.92  Yet, despite 
being seemingly contradictory, both Gypsum and Yellow Cab 
formulations of the clear-error standard of review have been 
subsequently reaffirmed.93 
In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the Fourth Circuit’s finding that a trial 
court committed clear error when it made a factual determination 
that a selection committee had skipped over a female candidate 
for a position as recreational director on the basis of her gender.94  
After weighing the evidence itself, the appellate court found that 
the selection committee had not in fact discriminated against the 
candidate because she was a woman.95  The Supreme Court 
found that both lower courts’ factual determinations were 
supported by the facts in the record and neither was “illogical or 
implausible.”96  The Court held that, although the Fourth Circuit’s 
view was just as permissible as the trial court’s conclusion, judicial 
deference in favor of a trial court’s factual findings required 
reversal.97  Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a finding of clear 
error is appropriate when the trial court’s factual determination is 
“illogical and implausible” or lacks “support in inferences that may 
be drawn from facts in the record.”98 
The Hinkson court noted that this series of decisions has led 
to confusion over when an appellate court should exercise its 
power to reverse a trial court’s factual findings.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
standard prior to Hinkson stated that a trial court “abuses its 
discretion when it makes an error of law, when it rests its decision 
on clearly erroneous factual findings, or when [the appellate court 
is] left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court 
committed a clear error of judgment.”99 
 
 91 See id. 
 92 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1260. 
 93 Id.; see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (applying U.S. Gypsum’s 
formulation of clear-error standard of review); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 400-01 (1990) (applying definition of “clearly erroneous” that was first articulated in 
Yellow Cab). 
 94 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 571 (1985). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 577. 
 97 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261. 
 98 Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577. 
 99 United States v. 4.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Lincoln County, 
10
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But this meant that appellate panels had been left to 
themselves to decide whether they had reached  a “definite and 
firm conviction that [a] mistake [had] been committed,” or whether 
a trial court’s factual finding was even “permissible.”100  The 
Hinkson majority opined that there were consequently no effective 
checks on an appellate court’s power to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the district court.101  In Hinkson, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a new objective abuse-of-discretion standard that 
attempted to merge the U.S. Gypsum, Yellow Cab, and Anderson 





B.  THE NEW ABUSE-OF-DISCRETION TEST 
The new abuse-of-discretion test adopted in Hinkson provides 
a two-pronged approach to determining abuse of discretion.103  
First, the appellate court should look to whether the district court 
identified the correct legal standard; if the district court failed to do 
so, then it abused its discretion.104  Second, the appellate court 
must determine whether the trial court’s application of the correct 
legal standard was (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without 
support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the 
record; if any of these three applies, then the trial court abused its 
discretion by making a clearly erroneous finding of fact.105 
1. Whether the Appropriate Legal Standard Was Applied 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a district 
court abuses its discretion if it makes an “error of law.”106  Here, 
the district court denied Hinkson’s new-trial motion.107  By applying 
the Harrington test, the district court identified and applied the 
 
Mont., 546 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251 (citing 4.85 Acres of Land, 546 F.3d at 617). 
 101 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1251. 
 102 Id. at 1261. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1261-62. 
 105 Id. at 1262-63. 
 106 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 
405 (1990)). 
 107 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1257. 
11
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relevant law related to a motion for a new trial.108  The Harrington 
test requires a criminal defendant seeking a new trial to prove (1) 
the evidence is newly discovered, (2) the defendant was diligent in 
seeking the evidence, (3) the evidence is material to the issues at 
trial, (4) the evidence is not (a) cumulative or (b) merely 
impeaching, and (5) the evidence indicates the defendant would 
probably be acquitted in a new trial.109  If the issue on appeal is 
“essentially factual,” then the issue becomes whether the district 
court’s findings of fact, and its application of those findings of fact 
to the rule of law were illogical, implausible, or without support in 
inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.110 
The Hinkson court concluded that the substance of Hinkson’s 
appeal was one that was “essentially factual.”111  The question 
here did not turn on the definition or determination of legal 
concepts.112  Rather, the district court’s decision to deny the new-
trial motion rested on the factual events that occurred at trial and 
the factual value of Hinkson’s newly discovered evidence.113 As a 
result, the Ninth Circuit turned to the question of whether the 
district court’s findings of fact and its application of the Harrington 
factors to the facts were illogical, implausible, or lacking in support 
from the record.114 
2.  Illogical, Implausible, or Lacking in Support from the Record 
The Hinkson majority held that the district court did not err in 
finding that the evidence offered in Hinkson’s motion for a new 
trial was not newly discovered.115  The majority found that, 
although the Miller and Woodring affidavits were newly written, 
they offered nothing new beyond what was known at trial.116  
Instead, the affidavits merely supported evidence that was 
deemed inadmissible at trial.117  Therefore, the en banc panel 
concluded that the trial court’s determination that the evidence 
 
 108 Id. at 1264. 
 109 United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 110 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), 
abrogated on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
 111 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1264. 
 112 Id. at 1259. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1264. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1264. 
 117 Id. 
12
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was not “newly discovered” was logical and plausible.118 
The Hinkson court also concluded that the trial court’s 
determination that Hinkson’s attorney failed to exercise due 
diligence in discovery was logical, plausible, and based on 
inferences supported by the record.119  The court noted that 
Hinkson’s lawyer admitted to conducting an investigation of 
Swisher’s military record for “quite some time.”120  In fact, months 
prior to the trial, current counsel represented Hinkson in a civil trial 
against Swisher.121  In a civil deposition, Swisher mentioned his 
service in the Korean War, a war that occurred when he was too 
young to enlist in the armed forces.122  Similar statements made 
by Swisher were also found in grand jury transcripts provided to 
defense counsel.123  The trial court also noted the months that 
passed between Swisher’s first cross-examination and the 
procurement of the affidavits, and that Hinkson’s counsel failed to 
ask for a continuance.124  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that no clear 
error occurred in the trial court’s determination that defense 
counsel failed to exercise due diligence.125 
Similarly, the Hinkson court noted that the district court was 
well within its traditional powers of discretion when it determined 
that the evidence being offered was collateral and immaterial to 
the issues at trial.126  The relevant issue was what Swisher had 
told Hinkson.127  The trial court determined that the evidence of 
Swisher’s actual military service record (or lack thereof) would 
have confused or misled the jury as to the relevant issues.128  The 
trial court also determined that authenticating and explaining the 
documents would cause an unreasonable delay.129 
Finally, the Hinkson court held that the district court did not 
err in ruling that the evidence would not result in an acquittal at re-
trial.130  The district court opined that the affidavits would prove 
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only that Swisher lied about his military service.131  The collateral 
nature of this evidence would make it inadmissible under Rule 403 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the outcome of the trial 
would not change.132  Therefore, the Hinkson court held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion, because this factual 
determination was based on reasonable inferences from the 
facts.133 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court 
identified the correct legal standard to analyze Hinkson’s motion 
for a new trial and the court’s findings of fact, and that the district 
court’s application of the correct legal standard to those findings of 
fact was not illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences 
that could be drawn from the facts in the record.134  Therefore, the 
Hinkson court ruled that the district court had not abused its 
discretion in denying Hinkson’s new-trial motion.135 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
By applying the new objective test for an abuse-of-discretion 
determination, the Hinkson majority stated that it was simply 
clarifying the existing standard.136  However, the new objective 
two-part test offers definite direction for future Ninth Circuit 
adjudications.  In fact, in the two months following the decision, 
U.S. v. Hinkson was cited by twenty-one Ninth Circuit decisions 
and many more briefs by counsel.137 
Litigants may have to be more creative in persuading 
appellate courts that particular factual findings are illogical, 
implausible, or without support in inferences from the facts in the 
record.  The Hinkson majority made only cursory reference to 
these three terms and failed to shine any new light onto what 
kinds of findings would fit these descriptions.  It is likely that 
subsequent cases will be required to fill in the lines drawn by 
United States v. Hinkson. 
Focus will once again be placed on the “main event” of the 
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trial.138  Litigants will be forced to concentrate their efforts and 
energies on the trial and convincing the trier of fact that their 
version of the events is right.139  Judicial resources will be 
conserved in that only the trial court will be burdened with 
duplicative and lengthy factual determinations.140 
One outcome from Hinkson is certain:  it will afford more 
deference to the trial courts in their factual findings and the 
application of those facts to law.  By announcing this new test, the 
Hinkson court was clear as to what level of deference appellate 
courts should afford trial courts in similar cases in the future. 
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